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Of Myths and Evidence: An Analysis of 40 U.S. Cases for
Countries Considering a Private Right of Action for
Competition Law Violations

Robert H. Lande and
Joshua P. Davis 1
May 19, 2009
“[P]rivate rights of action U.S. style
are poison. They over-reached dramatically.”
Bush Administration Federal Trade Commission
Chairman William Kovacic. 2
This quotation reflects the prevailing view towards
private rights of action in the competition or antitrust
field. Many commentators, especially members of the defense
bar, have criticized the existing United States system of
private antitrust litigation. Some assert that private actions
all too often result in remedies that provide lucrative fees
1

The authors are, respectively, Venable Professor of Law,
University of Baltimore School of Law, and a Director of the
American Antitrust Institute; Professor of Law and Director,
Center for Law and Ethics, University of San Francisco School
of Law, and member of the Advisory Board of the American
Antitrust Institute. This article is a condensation and
revision of ”Benefits From Private Antitrust Enforcement: An
Analysis of Forty Cases,” 42 U. San Francisco L. Rev. 879
(2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090661.
For summaries of the individual case studies analyzed in this
article see “Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust
Enforcement: Forty Individual Case Studies,” (hereafter
“Benefits”)
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105523
2

William E. Kovacic, speaking at an ABA panel on Exemptions
and Immunities, quoted in FTC:WATCH No. 708, Nov. 19, 2007, at
4. Kovacic was summarizing the conventional wisdom in the
field but was not necessarily agreeing with it.

1

for plaintiffs’ lawyers but secure no significant benefits for
overcharged victims. 3

Others suggest that private litigation

merely follows an easy trail blazed by government enforcers
and adds little to government sanctions. 4 Yet others contend
that, in light of government enforcement, private cases in the
United States lead to excessive deterrence. 5

Further, one

3

Professor Cavanagh ably summarized this belief: “Many class
action suits generate substantial fees for counsel but produce
little, if any, benefit to the alleged victims of the
wrongdoing. Coupon settlements, wherein plaintiffs settle for
‘cents off’ coupons while their attorneys are paid their full
fees in cash .... are of dubious value to the victims of
antitrust violations.... [and] defendants are not forced to
disgorge their ill-gotten gains when coupons are not
redeemed.” Edward Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84
Or. L. Rev. 147, 163 (2005)(footnote omitted).
However, Professor Cavanagh provides only an anecdote to
support these conclusions. He offers no data to show the type
of antitrust settlements he describes are typical or to
demonstrate how often they result in useless coupons.
4

John C. Coffee, Jr. at one point subscribed to this view,
but later concluded the evidence was to the contrary. John C.
Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The
Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law
Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 n.
36 (1986) (“Although the conventional wisdom has long been
that class actions tend to ‘tag along’ on the heels of
governmentally initiated suits, a recent study of antitrust
litigation by Professors Kauper and Snyder has placed this
figure at ‘[l]ess than 20% of private antitrust actions filed
between 1976 and 1983.’”).
5

As the Antitrust Modernization Commission noted: “[S]ome
have argued that treble damages, along with other remedies,
can overdeter some conduct that may not be anticompetitive and
result in duplicative recovery. No actual cases or evidence or
systematic overdeterrence were presented to the Commission,
however.” ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 247
2

common criticism of private actions in general — and of class
actions in particular — is that they are a form of legalized
blackmail or extortion, one in which plaintiffs’ attorneys
coerce defendants into settlements based not on meritorious
claims, but rather on the cost of litigation or fear of an
erroneous and catastrophic judgment. 6

These actions also are

(2007) (citation omitted), available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/amc_f
inal_report.pdf (footnotes omitted).
For reasons why “treble damages” do not lead to excessive
deterrence but, on the contrary should be increased, see
Robert H. Lande, Five Myths about Antitrust Damages, 40 U.S.F.
L. Rev. 651 (2006),available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1263478
6

See John H. Beisner and Chares E. Borden, Expanding
Private Causes of Action: Lessons from the U.S. Litigation
Experience, available at
www.instituteforlegalreform.com/resources/ExpandingPrivateCaus
esofActionFinal.doc. However, people like Beisner & Bordon
who embrace this view provide no systematic empirical basis
for its factual predicates. Similarly unsupported is their
claim that the cost of discovery for defendants can run into
“the tens of millions of dollars.” Id. at 13. Much the same
is true for the claim that class counsel receive high fee
awards but the class receives little of value. See, e.g., id.
at 218.
Also lacking is evidence that defendants regularly settle
antitrust class actions simply to avoid the risk of an
erroneous, catastrophic loss. This settlement rate is about
the same as in general litigation. See, e.g., Allan Kanner
and Tibor Nagy, Explosing the Black Mail Myth: A New
Perspective on Class Action Settlements, 57 Baylor L. Rev.
681, 697 (2005). Moreover, the amounts of these settlements
are far greater than the cost of defending litigation -suggesting that defendants were responding to a real risk of
liability in agreeing to pay damages rather than merely
seeking to avoid the cost of the litigation itself.
3

said to discourage legitimate competitive behavior. 7 For these
and related reasons many members of the antitrust community
call for the curtailment of private enforcement, 8 some even
for its abolition. 9

7

AMC Commissioner Cannon wrote: "Private plaintiffs are very
often competitors of the firms they accuse of antitrust
violations, and have every incentive to challenge and thus
deter hard competition that they cannot or will not meet....
litigation is expensive and courts and juries may erroneously
conclude that procompetitive or competitively neutral conduct
violates the antitrust laws... potential defendants... will
refrain from engaging in some forms of potentially
procompetitive conduct in order to avoid the cost and risk of
litigation." W. Stephen Cannon, A Reassessment of Antitrust
Remedies: The Administration’s Antitrust Remedies Reform
Proposal: Its Derivation and Implications, 55 Antitrust L.J.
103 (1986).
8

For example, Professor Hovenkamp writes that treble damages
and attorneys' fees for victorious plaintiffs give plaintiffs
too great an incentive to sue: "As a result, many marginal and
even frivolous antitrust cases are filed every year, and
antitrust litigation is often used as a bargaining chip to
strengthen the hands of plaintiffs who really have other
complaints." Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise:
Principle and Execution 59 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press 2005). Professor Hovenkamp does not, however, give data
that supports his conclusions.
9

For example, Professors Breit and Elzinga would ”replace the
entire damage induced private actions approach with a system
of fines (well in excess of current levels). This proposal
would eliminate the perverse incentives and misinformation
effects and reparation costs.” William Breit & Kenneth G.
Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning, 28
J.L. & Econ. 405, 440 (1985). Professors Elzinga and Breit do
not, however, provide data to support their conclusions.

4

Although these criticisms are widespread, they have been
made without any empirical basis. 10

Those who point to the

alleged flaws of the United Sates system of private antitrust
enforcement support their arguments only with anecdotes, many
of which are self-serving or questionable. They never provide
reliable data. 11
We emphasize that we are not disputing all critics’
anecdotes.

Private antitrust enforcement, which includes in

most years more than 90% of antitrust cases in the United
States, 12 certainly is imperfect. 13

Our point, however, is

10

One prominent critic, former ABA Antitrust Section Chair Jan
McDavid, candidly admitted this: "[The] issue [of class action
abuse] was never directly presented in these cases, but many
of these issues arise in the context of class actions in which
the potential for abuse is really pretty extraordinary." When
asked by Andrew Gavil about empirical evidence, McDavid said:
"I am not aware of empirical data on any of those issues. My
empirical data are derived from cases in which I am involved."
Antitrust, Volume 21, Fall 2007, No. 4, at 12-13.
11

For example, Michael Denger, former ABA Antitrust Section
Chair, wrote: “Substantial windfalls go to plaintiffs that are
not injured or only minimally injured.” Remarks of Michael L.
Denger, Chair’s program, 50th Anniversary Spring Meting, ABA
Antitrust Section, April 24-26, 2002, at 15. Mr. Denger,
however, provides no data to prove his assertions, or any
citations to scholarly articles containing such data. He does
not even provide a single supporting anecdote. He also does
not discuss why society would be better off if antitrust
violators were permitted to keep their illegal windfalls, the
end result of his positions.
12

See Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics Online,
http//wwwalbany/edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5412004.pdf Table
5.41.2004, Antitrust Cases filed in U.S. District Courts, by
type of case, 1975-2004.
5

that nations considering private enforcement should first
fairly assess its effects in the United States.

They should

not confuse anecdotes with data. One factor they should
consider carefully is the systematic benefit of private
actions to victimized consumers and businesses, and to the
economy more generally.

The Purpose and Design of This Study
This article is a first step towards providing the
empirical data necessary to assess some of the benefits of
private enforcement of the United States antitrust laws. It
does this by analyzing a group of 40 recent, successful,
large-scale private antitrust cases. We analyze, inter alia,
the amount of money each action recovered for victims, what
proportion of the money was recovered from foreign entities,
whether the private litigation was preceded by government
action, and on whose behalf money was recovered (direct
purchasers, indirect purchasers, or a competitor).

To our

knowledge no similar study has ever been undertaken.
We note that this report does not purport to be
comprehensive or in any way definitive.

It does not analyze

every recent significant private antitrust case, assess a

13

Government enforcement also is imperfect.

6

random sample of cases, or even include all of the largest or
“most important” ones. 14

We simply tried to assemble and

evaluate 40 of the largest and most successful cases that
concluded between 1990 and 2007. 15
The primary focus of this project, moreover, was not to
demonstrate that private litigation often has established
important legal precedents: other studies have done this
convincingly. 18

Our “first cut” was, instead, to look for

recent private cases that are final, including appeals, and
that recovered at least $50 million in cash for victims of
anticompetitive behavior. We included only recovered money:

14

For example, we were not able to include an analysis of the
consumer class action suits against Microsoft, even though a
highly respected journalist reported that together these cases
recovered more than $2 billion for victims. See Todd Bishop,
Todd Bishop‘s Microsoft Blog, July 7, 2006, available at
http://blog.seattlepi.nwsource.com/microsoft/month.asp?blogmon
th=7/1/2006&page=4.
15

In one case, the final settlement was approved within this
time frame, but the final award of fees and costs to the
attorneys did not occur until January, 2008. See In re Auto.
Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 569
(E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2008).
18

For an excellent analysis see Stephen Calkins, Coming to
Praise Criminal Antitrust Enforcement, European University
Institute 11th EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop,
(Florence, Italy, June 2-3 2006). Professor Calkins found
that, of leading antitrust cases decided before 1977, 12 were
private and 27 were government. Of the leading cases decided
1977 or later, however, he found that 30 were private cases
and only 15 were government cases. Id. at 17.

7

products, services, discounts, coupons, and injunctive relief
were not included in our results. 19

Results of this Study
Table 1 shows that the forty cases (or groups of cases) 20
analyzed in this report provided a cumulative recovery in the
range of at least $18,006 to $19,639 million in allegedly 21
illegally acquired wealth to U.S. consumers and businesses. 22
Of this, more than $5,706 to $7,056 million came from foreign
companies that violated U.S. antitrust laws. Table 2 shows
that 18 of the 40 cases involved this kind of recovery, which
means that without the private enforcement of the antitrust
laws this money would have remained with foreign lawbreakers
19

Securities were counted in one case because they had a
readily ascertainable market value.
20

To arrive at this number we counted related cases as being
a single “case.” For example, there have been many separate
legal actions involving vitamins cartels. However, this report
analyzes and counts them all together as one “case.”
21

For simplicity we are calling all of the charges
“allegations,” even the ones proven in court.
22

We did not change recoveries to 2009 dollars or otherwise
correct for the time-value of money. All figures include the
awarded attorneys’ fees.
Although a United States verdict would produce treble damages
for victims, almost all of our cases involved settlements, and
in no case did a court determine the percentage overcharge.
We know of no way to determine whether any of the settlements
exceeded single damages.

8

instead of being returned to U.S. consumers and businesses. 23
Given the current global market, no doubt the lack of a
private remedy means many citizens of nations other than the
U.S. remain uncompensated for harms they suffered from illegal
and anticompetitive conduct by actors beyond their national
borders.
It is interesting that of the total amount recovered a
large proportion - at least 42% to 46%; $7,631 to $8,981
million - came from the fifteen cases that did not follow
publicly disclosed United States government or EU enforcement
actions. 24

For each of the cases listed in Table 3, private

plaintiffs appear to have completely uncovered the violations,
and initiated and pursued the litigation, with the government
following the private plaintiffs’ lead or playing no role at
all.

Another $4,212 million came from cases with a mixed

private/public origin (Table 4). 25 Only about a third of the

23

This project did not select cases on the basis of whether a
foreign defendant was likely to be involved.
24

When conduct gave rise to both government and private
litigation we tried to ascertain who first uncovered the
antitrust violation. For many of the cases our researchers
spent dozens of hours on this issue. However, because
government records are confidential and the enforcers usually
do not reveal or discuss their investigations, we could not
always make definitive classifications. Because we had access
only to publicly available information some of our
classifications could be mistaken.
25
For example In re Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litig., 93
F. Supp. 2d 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2000) started as a result of a
9

total private recovery – $6,163 to $6,446 million – occurred
in cases that were purely public in origin.
Still other private cases followed a government
investigation, but provided significantly greater relief than
the government action (if, indeed, a government action was
brought), expanded the scope of inquiry and claims, or
obtained relief against parties not included in the government
actions (Table 5). There also were cases whose origin we were
not able to ascertain. 27 The authors were surprised at the
high proportion of private actions that were filed in the
absence of government cases, that had mixed public/private
origins, or that significantly expanded the relief obtained
through government enforcement alone.
Of the total $18,006 to $19,639 million in recoveries we
documented, $12,088 to $13,438 million (67%-68% of the total),
in 32 cases, was recovered by direct purchasers; $1,815
million, in 6 cases, was recovered by indirect purchasers; and

different private antitrust suit, which led to a government
investigation in the polypropylene carpet market, that in turn
led to the private litigation analyzed in this Report. See
Table 4 for other examples.
27

See, for example, the El Paso case summary, Benefits, supra
note 1.
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$4,028 to $4,311 million, in 6 cases, was recovered by
competitors. 29

All but 6 of the cases were class actions. 30

Some of the cases we analyzed also involved substantial
non-monetary relief.

For example, one case generated coupons,

fully redeemable in cash if not used for five years (however,
to be very conservative we did not count any part of this in
our “cash” recovery totals). 31

Another case resulted in a $125

million energy rate reduction for consumers (we did not count
this reduction in our benefits total). 32 Some cases involved
29

Direct purchasers are customers who bought a good or service
directly from a defendant, and indirect purchasers are
customers who purchased a good or service further down the
chain of distribution. In the U.S., in general only direct
purchasers and competitors can bring claims for damages under
federal law, and indirect purchasers can bring claims for
damages only under state law (most, but not all, U.S. states
allow indirect purchaser actions).
30

Although we did not intend this Report to focus on class
actions, the requirement of public court approval of class
action settlements enabled us to obtain information that often
is not available in individual settlements, the terms of which
often are confidential. Final verdicts are, of course,
publicly available for individual cases, but these are rare in
the antitrust field. See John M. Connor & Robert H. Lande, How
High do Cartels Raise Prices? Implications for Optimal Cartel
Fines, 80 Tul. L. Rev. 513, Appendix (2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105523.
31

See Auction House case summaries, Benefits, supra note 1.
These coupons traded for a value that reflected their
discounted present value. They also comprised 20% of the
legal fees paid to prevailing attorneys, who said they will
redeem them for cash after the expiration of the mandatory
five year waiting period.
32

See the El Paso summary.
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extremely useful cy pres grants. 33

Many other cases

restructured industries in ways that, according to the judge
presiding over the litigation, provided improvements for
competition even more beneficial than the monetary relief they
conferred on the victims. For example, the Visa/MasterCard
case was settled in April 2003 for “$3,383,400,000 in
compensatory relief, plus additional injunctive relief valued
at $25 to $87 billion or more." 34

Similarly, NASDAQ decreased

the spreads received by market makers, the Insurance
litigation eliminated restrictions on insurance policies, and
NCAA eliminated caps on pay to college coaches. 35

Further,

together the generic drug cases — Buspirone, Cardizem,
Oncology (Taxol), Relafen, Remeron, and Terazosin —
discouraged collusion between brand name and generic drug
manufacturers, saving consumers many hundreds of millions of
dollars in lower cost drugs. 36
33

See, for example, the Insurance case. This case resulted
in a cash settlement with a creative remedy that: (i) funded
the development of a public entity that provides risk
management education and technical services to small
businesses, public entities, and non profits; and (ii) provide
funds to the States to develop a risk database for
municipalities and local governments.
34

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa USA & MasterCard Int’l,
396 F.3d 96, 111 (2d Cir. 2005).
35

See Benefits, supra note 1.

36

See Benefits, supra note 1.
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In the cases we analyzed, the judges generally expressed
great satisfaction with the efforts of the plaintiffs’ counsel
that appeared before them.

To give a few examples, Judge

Nancy G. Edmunds (E.D. Mich.), in her opinion approving the
final settlement in the direct purchaser Cardizem case, noted
plaintiffs attorneys’ “excellent performance on behalf of the
Class in this hotly contested case.” 37 Chief Judge Thomas Hogan
in one of the vitamins cases (the choline chloride trial)
stated in his opening remarks to the jury pool:

”[T]his is a

very challenging and interesting case ... involving, I think,
some of the finest business litigating lawyers or litigationtype lawyers in the country that are before you that you will
have the privilege to listen to.” 38 There are numerous other

37

Order granting Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs’ Motions for
Final Approval of Settlement, Plan of Allocation and Sherman
Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorney’s Fees,
Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Awards for Named
Plaintiffs. Order No. 49 at pg 21. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust
Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682. Similarly, the Honorable Michael
M. Mihm, the judge who oversaw the Fructose litigation,
repeatedly praised class counsel. “I’ve said many times during
this litigation that you and the attorneys who represented the
defendants here are as good as it gets. Very professional...
You’ve always been cutting to the chase and not wasting my
time or each others’ time or adding to the cost of the And this
was very difficult litigation... Skill and efficiency of the
attorneys. As good as it gets. Complexity and duration of the
litigation. It was very complex. We made some new law on more
than one occasion... .” See Trial Transcript of Oct. 4, 2004,
at 45-46. In re Fructose Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1087,
Master File No. 94-1577.
38

May 28, 2003 Trial Tr. at 25:1-6.
13

examples of complimentary remarks:

The judge in Automotive

Refinishing Paint noted that plaintiffs’ counsel “repeatedly
demonstrated their skill in managing” the litigation; 39 the
court in Buspirone stated, “let me say that the lawyers in
this case have done a stupendous job.

They really have.” 40 The

court in Remeron thanked counsel on behalf of the judiciary
“for the kind of lawyering we wish everybody would do” 41 and
noted that “[t]he settlement entered with Defendants is a
reflection of Class Counsel’s skill and experience.” 42

Conclusions
The United States’ distinctive system of private
antitrust enforcement is substantially underappreciated. It

39

In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 29162, at *20 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2004).
40

http://www.milbergweiss.com/whymilberg citing In re
Buspirone Patent Litig., MDL Docket No. 1413, at 34:2-3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2003) (Final Approval Hearing Transcript).
The court in Linerboard made repeated comments to the effect
that “the lawyering in the case at every stage was superb;”
2005 WL 1221350, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2004). The court in
Relafen lauded “the exceptional efforts of class counsel” and
pointed out that the settlement was “the result of a great
deal of fine lawyering on behalf of the parties.” In re
Relafen Antitrust Litig., 231 F.R.D. 52, 80 (D. Mass. 2005).
41

In re Remeron Antitrust Litig., Civil Action No. 02-2007
(FSH) (D.N.J. 2005) (Transcript of Proceedings at 15:16).
42
In re Remeron Antitrust Litigation, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
27013 at *37 (D.N.J. 2005) (unpublished opinion).
14

has produced tremendous benefits for the United States economy
- for consumers and for businesses of all sizes. 43 It has
helped to deter anticompetitive behavior and to compensate
victims of illegal activity.

It has enabled U.S. businesses

and consumers to protect themselves from economic
exploitation, both by those who subvert the free market in
general and by foreign cartels in particular. It has saved the
U.S. taxpayer tremendous sums in enforcement costs by shifting
the enormous burdens and risks of litigating against
sophisticated, well-financed lawbreakers to private
plaintiffs’ counsel. Although negative assertions about the
efficacy of private United States antitrust litigation have
been very well publicized, this might well be due in large
part to the powerful economic interests that stand to benefit
from a curtailment of private antitrust enforcement in the
United States and from the prevention of private rights of
action for competition law violations in other nations.
As to the possibility of overdeterrence, the United
States awards what are nominally "treble damages" 44 to
victorious victims.

But in reality, various constraints on

43

Of course, because our cases were not randomly selected, it
is difficult to generalize from our conclusions.
44

The Unites States antitrust laws award treble damages as
well as attorneys’ fees to successful private plaintiffs. 15
U.S.C § 15 (Supp. 1992).

15

recovery mean that, even after nominal trebling of a judgment
at trial, plaintiffs likely recover less than single actual
damages. 45

Thus, nominal trebling is justified to compensate

victims for unawarded prejudgment interest, and for difficultto-quantify and unawarded damages items such as the allocative
inefficiency effects of market power and for the value of
victims' time expended pursuing litigation. 46

Further,

antitrust verdicts producing even nominal treble damages are
rare, 47 and we believe that few, if any, of the overwhelming

45

To the extent the purpose of the remedy is compensation, the
"damages" caused by an antitrust violation should consist of
the sum of all relatively predictable harms caused by that
violation affecting anyone other than the defendants. Damages
should include the wealth transferred from consumers to the
violator(s), as well as the allocative inefficiency effects
felt by society, whether caused directly, or indirectly via
"umbrella" effects. Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, the value of
plaintiffs' time spent pursuing the case, and the cost to the
American taxpayer of administering the judicial system should
also be included. When all these adjustments are made it is
likely that the United States “treble” damages remedy actually
is less than single damages. See Robert H. Lande, “Are
Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single Damages?” 54 Ohio
State L.J. 115, 122-24, 158-68 (1993), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1134822.
46

Id. As the Antitrust Modernization Commission noted:
“Indeed, in light of the fact that some damages may not be
recoverable (e.g., compensation for interest prior to
judgment, or because of the statute of limitations and the
inability to recover ‘speculative’ damages) treble damages
help ensure that victims will recover at least their actual
damages.” Antitrust Modernization Commission, Report and
Recommendations, at 246 (2007) (footnote omitted).
47

For a list of antitrust verdicts that calculated damages
amounts see Connor & Lande, supra note 30.

16

majority of antitrust cases that settle do so for more than
single nominal damages. 48
Moreover, while government criminal and civil actions are
essential to deter future antitrust violations, virtually the
only way to secure redress for the victims of antitrust
violations is through private litigation. 49

Private

enforcement at times has substituted for federal and state
action entirely when government did not act at all or did not
achieve meaningful results. At other times, private actions
have complemented governmental enforcement in many situations
where the government investigated, prosecuted, and imposed
penalties, but was unable to compensate private victims for
the harms they suffered as a result of antitrust violations.
Private antitrust enforcement also has restructured many
industries in ways that have improved efficiency and
competitiveness, redounding to the benefit of consumers, the
affected industries themselves, and the economy as a whole. 51

48

For an analysis of this issue see Robert H. Lande, “Why
Antitrust Damage Levels Should Be Raised, 16 Loyola Consumer
L. Rev. 329 (2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1118902.
49

In the United States, State Attorneys’ General can bring
parens patria actions on behalf of victims located within
their states, and the Federal Trade Commission has succeeded
in disgorgement actions, but these actions are rare.
51
As Irwin Stelzer observed, “An army of private enforcers,
enlisting help from attorney-entrepreneurs free to accept
17

In fact, there are many reasons to believe that, as a
practical matter the government cannot be expected to do all
or even most of the necessary enforcing of antitrust or
competition laws for various reasons including: budgetary
constraints; 52 undue fear of losing cases; 53 lack of awareness
of industry conditions; 54 overly suspicious views about

cases on a contingency fee basis, freed of ‘loser pays’
obligations, is an important supplement to those limited
[government] resources.... some 80% of court decisions
establishing important principles (not all of which I find
agreeable, I might add) in the competition policy area have
resulted from private actions.” Irwin Stelzer, Implications
for Productivity Growth in the Economy, notes for talk at
Workshop on Private Enforcement of Competition Law, sponsored
by Office of Fair Trading, at p. 2 (London, England, Oct. 19,
2006).
52

This is especially true in the current climate of tight
federal budgets.
53

Professor Calkins notes: “Governmental agencies also
hesitate to litigate because of fear of defeat. Courtroom
setbacks can demoralize agency staff, raise questions in the
eyes of observers, and impose political costs. Few agency
annual reports boast about the well-fought loss, and, in an
era in which governmental accountability is fashionable, it is
challenging to characterize losses as accomplishments.
All too often, agencies worry about their win rates.... and
general counsels who are nominated for higher office like to
claim that their agency won a high percentage of its cases.
Everyone wants a good batting average. Unfortunately, a single
loss can ruin a good batting average compiled with few atbats.” Stephen Calkins, In Praise of Antitrust Litigation: The
Second Annual Bernstein Lecture, 72 St. John’s L. Rev. 1
(1998) (citations omitted).
54

“Private parties operating in the real markets...[will] act
on the reality they confront.” Stelzer, supra note 51, at 4.
”The administrators of our antitrust laws might not feel
18

complaints by “losers” that they were in fact victims of
anticompetitive behavior; 55 high turnover among government
attorneys; 56 and the unfortunate reality that government
enforcement (or non-enforcement) decisions are at times
politically motivated. 57

Not surprisingly, a vigorous private

antitrust or competition regime is likely to confer
significant benefits over and above those conferred by a
system reliant solely upon government enforcement.
In the United States anticompetitive conduct occurs far
too frequently and is almost certainly significantly

competent to tell what sort of pricing practice is
exclusionary or predatory. But the victims most certainly
can.” Id. at 5.
55

Of course, many do not believe this. “[W]ho better to argue
that ... [certain conduct is anticompetitive] than a
competitor, injured by illegal anticompetitive practices,
conversant in the technical jargon, on the sharp edge of
customer relations, well informed on the details and
consequences of the dominant firm’s practices.” Id. at 5-6.
56

The largest antitrust cases often last for 5-10 years. The
government often has trouble retaining a well qualified team
throughout this period. Private firms, by contrast, often are
able to retain relatively intact teams for longer periods.
57

Irwin Stelzer noted: “A less obvious but equally important
reason that private enforcement is so important is that it is
free of direct political influence. In America,
administrations come and go, some more given to a jaundiced
view of the activities of dominant firms than others, witness
the soft settlement worked out with Microsoft when the Bush
administration took office and control of the Department of
Justice, and its current disinclination to file any Section 2
cases.“ Seltzer, supra note 51, at 6.
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underdeterred 58 - even factoring in the effects of the present
system of private litigation.

A fortiori this conduct would

be even more undeterred if the United States eliminated or
substantially curtailed private enforcement.

We would be

surprised if firms in other nations were significantly more
law abiding than those in the United States, and suspect that
the United States record of underdeterrence of anticompetitive
conduct (and undercompensation of victims) exists in many
other nations as well.
Having said that, we recognize each nation has unique
needs, history, institutions, capabilities and circumstances,
and we would never advocate “one size fits all” competition
legislation.

But we do urge every nation without private

enforcement of its competition laws to seriously consider that
possibility.

In doing so, policymakers should consider

private enforcement as it actually works in the United States,
not a mere caricature, one too often presented by selfinterested parties who oppose antitrust enforcement in
general.

58

See Lande, supra note 48, and Connor & Lande, supra note 30.
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Appendix I
The following tables provide a summary of key information
about the antitrust cases studied by this report. For the
individual analyses of the 40 cases studied in our report see
“Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust Enforcement: Forty
Individual Case Studies,”
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105523.
All results were rounded to the nearest million dollars:
Table 1: Recoveries in Private Cases

Case

Recovery ($ millions)

Airline Ticket Commission
Litigation
Auction Houses
Augmentin

86

452 (plus 100 in uncounted
fully redeemable coupons)
91

Automotive Refinishing Paint

106

Buspirone

220

Caldera

275

Cardizem (direct class)

110

Citric Acid

175

Commercial Explosives
Conwood

77
1,050

DRAM

326

Drill Bits
El Paso
Flat Glass

53
1,427 (plus 125 in uncounted
rate reductions)
122

Fructose

531

Graphite Electrodes

47
22

IBM

Insurance

775 (plus $75 in uncounted
credit towards Microsoft
software)
36

Lease Oil

193

Linerboard

202

Lysine

65

Microcrystalline Cellulose

50

NASDAQ

1,027

NCAA

74

Netscape

750

Paxil

165

Platinol

50

Polypropylene Carpet

50

RealNetworks

478 to 761

Relafen

250

Remeron

75

Rubber Chemicals

268

Sorbates

96

Specialty Steel

50

Sun

700

Taxol

66

Terazosin

74

Urethane

73

23

Visa/MasterCard

3,383

Vitamins

3,908 to 5,258

Total

18,006 to 19,639
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Table 2: Recoveries from Foreign Cartels & Monopolies
Case

Recovery ($ millions)

Auction Houses

virtually all the $452 was
recovered by U.S. citizens
91

Augmentin
Automotive Refinishing Paint

31

Cardizem
Citric Acid
Commercial Explosives

110
55 plus unidentified
recoveries by opt outs
62

DRAM

311

Graphite Electrodes

47

Flat Glass

38

Fructose

100

Lysine

24

Microcrystalline Cellulose

25

Remeron

75

Relafen
Rubber Chemicals

Unknown amount - much of $250;
but not included in totals
268

Sorbates

36

Urethane

73

Vitamins

3,908

to

5,258

Total

5,706

to

7,056
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Table 3: Private Litigation Not Preceded by Government Action
Case

Recovery ($ millions)

Augmentin

91

Buspirone

220

Cardizem

110

Taxol

66

Caldera

275

Commercial Explosives
Conwood

77
1,050

Microcrystalline Cellulose

50

NCAA

74

NASDAQ

1,027

Lease Oil

193

Paxil

165

Relafen

250

Remeron

75

Vitamins

3,908

to

5,258

Total

7,631

to 8,981

Note: We did not include cases in which we were unable to
determine whether private or public action came first, in
which the two arose simultaneously or in a mixed fashion, or
which resulted from government investigation into a different
conspiracy.
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Table 4: Cases with a Mixed Private/Public Origin

Case
Drill bits - private suit led
to government investigation
which prompted this suit
Flat Glass - DOJ
investigation but no
indictment or civil
proceeding ever initiated by
government
Fructose - uncovered by
government action, but no
indictments

Recovery ($ millions)
53

122

531

Polypropylene Carpet conduct uncovered in
different private case, to
DOJ investigation, to private
case
Urethane - grew out of a
government investigation into
a conspiracy involving a
different chemical
Visa/MasterCard – unclear
which investigation began
first, although private
action was filed well before
government action and
addressed different conduct.
Total

50

73

3,383

4,212
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Table 5: Private Recoveries that Were Significantly
than the Government Enforcement Action (in addition
the compensation to victims noted in Table 1) (Does
include the cases in Table 3 that were not preceded
government action
Case

Automotive Refinishing Paint

El Paso

Fructose
Insurance

Linerboard

Polypropylene Carpet

Relafen

Sun v. Microsoft

Specialty Steel

Broader
to all of
not
by a

Why private recovery was
significantly more than
government remedy
Government investigation
yielded no indictments;
private cases got $106
million.
Private plaintiffs obviated
need for separate government
action seeking monetary
recovery.
Government did not indict
antitrust violators.
Private plaintiffs provided
compensation and contributed
to restructuring of industry,
eliminating restrictions on
insurance and reinsurance.
FTC action was against one
firm for unilateral conduct;
the private case involved a
conspiracy.
Private plaintiffs obtained
greater monetary recovery and
prosecuted larger number of
defendants.
No federal case; state
governments intervened only
after settlement – private
plaintiffs provided the
compensation to victims.
Private plaintiffs made
broader allegations than U.S.
government action, obtained
information that supported
later European action, and
protected distribution of
“pure” Java software.
Private action included longer
time period.
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Table 6: Recoveries by Category of Plaintiff
Direct
Case

Indirect
Result

Case

Competitor
Result

Case

Result Case Resul
1,050

Augmentin

62

Augmentin

29

Conwood

Lysine

50

Lysine

15

Sun

Auction Houses

Paxil

65

220

Relafen

75

IBM

775

Cardizem

110

El Paso

Netscape

750

DRAM

326

Citric Acid

175

Flat Glass

121

Fructose

531

106

Graphite
Electrodes

47

Insurance

36

Linerboard

202

Vitamins

Microcrystalline
50
Cellulose
Oil Lease
193
Paxil

100

Platinol

50

Polypropylene
Carpet
Relafen

50
175

29

204

700

Real478
Networks to
761
Caldera
275

Automotive
Refinishing
Buspirone

452

Unsure

1,427

Specialty Steel

50

Terazosin

74

Urethane

73

Visa/MasterCard

3,383

Vitamins

3,704 to
5,054

NASDAQ

1,027

Sorbates

96

Drill Bits

53

Commercial
Explosives

77

Remeron

75

Rubber Chemicals 268
Taxol
66
Airline Tickets
Commission
Total

86
12,088
to
13,438

1,815

4,028
to
4,311

Note: The El Paso settlement was recovered mostly, but not
entirely, by indirect purchasers. We have not been able to
segregate the small amount of recovery by direct purchasers.
In addition, it should be noted that NCAA involved a monopsony
by direct purchasers. The Airline Tickets Commission case also
involved collusion by buyers.

30

